Category: Thought Leadership
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Joiner-Mover-Leaver for AI Agents: Create, Rotate, and Retire Access Before It Drifts
AI agents need lifecycle management because they can hold credentials, inherit permissions, call tools, and act across systems. Learn how joiner-mover-leaver maps to create, rotate, and retire controls for agentic AI and non-human identities.
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Mandiant Got Inside. The AI Threats Were Not What Anyone Expected.
Mandiant’s AI Risk and Resilience report shows a useful gap between perceived AI risk and real implementation failures: browser caching, SQL injection, broken access control, SSRF, excessive agency, and missing visibility.
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Quantum’s First Real Job
IBM’s recent KCuF3 quantum materials simulation result is one of the clearest near-term proof points for enterprise-relevant quantum computing. This post breaks down what changed, what did not, and why the result matters to SecOps teams, platform engineers, and CISOs watching hybrid compute, governance, and post-quantum planning right now.
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Secrets and Tokens: Rotation SLAs, Blast Radius, and Attacker Dwell Time
Long-lived secrets are not harmless leftovers. They are blast radius waiting for an incident. This post breaks down rotation SLAs, attacker dwell time, delegated OAuth risk, and the operational habits that keep non-human credentials from becoming tomorrow’s breach path. Built for practitioners who have to run the mess in production.
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Agent Inventory and the Agent Register: The Control You Need Before Agent Sprawl Becomes Identity Debt
AI agents do not create a new governance problem so much as a faster identity problem. This post explains why agent inventories, Agent Registers, and ownership discipline matter, how discovery differs from authorization, and what teams need to prove scope, effective access, lifecycle, and accountability before something breaks in production.
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When Your MDM Becomes the Weapon
A cyberattack on Stryker in March 2026 disrupted operations across 79 countries without a single piece of malware. Publicly reported attack path: Microsoft Intune administrative abuse. This post breaks down what happened, what could not have been predicted, what the governance gaps were, and what every Intune admin should do…





